C.C.P. Section 47(b) provides absolute immunity from liability for any tort, other than malicious prosecution, based on a report of suspected criminal activity to law enforcement authorities.

 In Hagberg vs. California Federal Bank FSB (2004) 32 Cal.4th 39, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, the California Supreme Court held that statements to the police were absolutely privileged under Code of Civil Procedure Section 47(b) and therefore provided immunity from liability for any tort other than malicious prosecution. Plaintiff had sued her bank for false arrest, false imprisonment and violation of her Civil Rights after she was arrested at the bank by police who were acting on false information provided to them by the bank. The bank’s actions were characterized as inadvertent. In upholding summary judgment the Supreme Court determined that the immunity afforded by C.C.P. Section 47(b) was absolute regardless of whether the report of suspected criminal activity was negligent or intentional, disapproving of Fenelon vs. Superior Court (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1476, 273 Cal.Rptr. 367. The Court declined to resolve plaintiff’s contention that her civil rights claim could be pursued notwithstanding C.C.P. Section 47(b) on the ground that there was insufficient evidence in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment to raise an inference that the bank employees may have been motivated by racial prejudice.

In the companion case of Moulder vs. Pilot Air Freight (2004) 32 Cal.4th 34, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 828 the California Supreme Court upheld the trial’s court dismissal of a complaint for false imprisonment based on the defendants’ reporting to the police that plaintiff had stolen a flight recorder, holding that the false imprisonment claim was barred by the absolute privilege for statements made in official proceedings under C.C.P. Section 47(b).

Religious counselors are not held to the same standard of care applicable to a licensed professional counselor.

In the case of Jacqueline R. v. Household of Faith Family Church, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 198, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 264, the Fourth Appellate District upheld the trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the defendant Church where a married couple had sued a pastor in the church to whom the husband had gone for marriage counseling. The pastor was alleged to have engaged in sexual conduct with the wife. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the Church counselor should be held to the same tort liability imposed on licensed marriage counselors.

Cause of action for invasion of privacy stated.

In the case of Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharmaceuticals (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 365, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 410. Plaintiff sued a pharmaceutical company after its sales representative had been present during a breast examination of the Plaintiff by her physician. The sales representative was present during the examination as part of a "mentor" program wherein sales representatives would accompany physicians through their daily activities as part of their training. Plaintiff alleged that the representative was identified only as someone who worked with the physician when the examination began.

In filing a demurrer to the Plaintiff's complaint, the Defendant argued that the cause of action for invasion of privacy did not meet the standard of an "intrusion that is highly offensive to a reasonable person." The definition of the tort of intrusion consists of two elements: (1) the intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.

The Plaintiff must show that the Defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy or obtained unwanted access to information concerning the Plaintiff. The invasion can only be proven if the Plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in a place, conversation or information.

The trial court sustained the demurrer apparently relying upon the argument that the Plaintiff had consented to the presence of the sales representative. The Appellate Court reversed the dismissal, finding that, under the facts pled in the complaint, Plaintiff had not "consented" to the presence of the sales representative insofar as Plaintiff had not been informed fully as to the identity of the sales representative and his purpose for being in the room during the examination. The Appellate Court ruled that a jury should determine whether there was an intrusion into a private matter in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.

It should be noted that this tort applies not only to a physical invasion of privacy but additionally to the disclosure of confidential information concerning the Plaintiff. Whether a particular act is actionable will be determined by the trial courts on a case by case basis.

In California, there is no longer a tort cause of action for spoilation of evidence.

The California Supreme Court essentially eliminated any cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 CaI.4th 1, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248. In Coprich v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1081, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 884, the Second District held that the same rationale applies to negligent spoilation of evidence, and eliminated the cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence as well. The Supreme Court has denied review. 

In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, the high court stated that "the destruction of evidence is a grave affront to the cause of justice," but ruled it is not a tort, and other methods of dealing with such problems (e.g., sanctions) will have to suffice.